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abstraCt: Just what are we talking about when we talk about the content of perception? There are a number
of different questions which are often asked about the precise nature of this content, such as to what extent it
is representational, and to what extent this representation is conceptual in character.1 However, these questions
usually gloss over what it is to talk about perceptual content qua content, in their haste to talk about it qua
representation or conception. On this basis, it is all too tempting to account for not only the specific character
of the content, but also how it is individuated, in phenomenological terms.2 This is to say that perceptual
content is understood as whatever is contained within an introspective domain to which we have some sort of
special access. Wilfrid Sellars’ attack on the myth of the given has provided us with good reason to doubt the
epistemic authority such special access to our inner states purportedly provides, and thus to doubt the efficacy
of any account of perceptual content that gives introspection such a fundamental role.3 This is his critique of
what Jim O’Shea has called the epistemic given.4 However, there is a further side to the myth that Sellars
critiques, which O’Shea calls the categorial given. The aim of the present paper is to articulate and explain the
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1 I am here lumping together a number of different though overlapping debates the terminology of which
diverges in various ways. I do not wish to give a complete taxonomy and genealogy of the phrases ‘mental
content’, ‘phenomenal content’, and ‘sensory content’ within the literature and the various degrees to which
they have (or haven’t adequately) been distinguished. However, it is worth noting that there is a distinct thread
of debate that reserves the word ‘content’ for cases of representation (cf. Susanna Siegel, ‘The Contents of
Perception’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Jul 19 2010, accessed Oct 10, 2013,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/). The question is then whether the ‘phenomenal
character’ of perception constitutes a form of representational content, and the extent to which this is
conceptual or otherwise.
2 The reference to ‘phenomenology’ here is meant to include both those loose discussions of what
perceptual experience ‘is like’ that have proliferated in the analytic philosophy of perception and the more
methodologically defined introspective study of consciousness that derives from Husserl’s work. 
3 This is most famously presented in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ in Science, Perception,
and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 1963), pp. 127-196. Hereafter EPM.
4 James R. O’Shea, Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007),
ch. 5.
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latter by building upon Sellars’ critique of the former and the account of perception that ensues from it. This
involves demonstrating some constraints governing accounts of perceptual content on the basis of the
explanatory demands placed upon them as accounts of perception on the one hand, and the explanatory
resources available to them as accounts of content on the other. The result will be an account of the myth of
the categorial given that explains both why it is tempting and why we must resist this temptation.
Key words: Content of perception, mith of the given, Sellars, categories.
1. Perception and explanation
To begin with the explanatory demands, it seems to me that there are two distinct
explanatory enterprises that any account of perceptual content must contribute to. On the
one hand, there is the epistemological enterprise of explaining the general role that
perception can play in empirical justification independently of variations in the causal
structure of perceiving agents. This means telling a story about how the sensory inputs
fed into a causal system can gain the normative significance of warranting moves within
the space of reasons, in a way that could apply not only to different human beings, but
to stranger creatures such as aliens or artificial intelligences whose sensory capacities
and overall causal economy diverge radically from our own. On the other hand, there is
the psychological enterprise of explaining the specific role that perception plays in the
causal economy of particular perceiving agents. This means telling a story about how the
sensory inputs fed into a causal system contribute to the production of behavioural
outputs, in such a way as to give us predictive purchase upon the behaviour of creatures
with particular types of causal structure.
Although these enterprises are distinct, they are also importantly intertwined. Any
epistemology that cannot account for the way differences in the causal structure of our
sensory capacities can affect their role in empirical justification will have failed to get a
grip on the causal dimension of perception, or its connection to sensation, and any
psychology that cannot account for the way perception can supply us with reasons that
cause us to act one way rather than another will have failed to get a grip on the normative
dimension of perception, or its connection to rational agency. We only have an account
of perception, be it epistemological or psychological, when its causal and normative
dimensions are properly connected. Any account of perceptual content as something that
plays a role in both epistemological and psychological explanations must couch it in
terms amenable to both of these dimensions. The first insight that we can take from
Sellars here is that the proper interface between these two dimensions is the use of
functional explanation in empirical psychology. To use a phrase he is fond of – we must
understand perceptual content in terms of the way it fits into the ‘wiring diagram’ of the
perceiver.5
Causal explanation in general works by applying explanatory schemas to systems
that facilitate the development of predictions about the way that they would behave
under various possible conditions. These schemas provide us with more or less general
ways of organising counterfactual reasoning about these possibilities, thereby enabling
5 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Being and Being Known’, in Science, Perception, and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview
Publishing, 1963), pp. 41-59, §37. Hereafter BBK.
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us to draw specific conclusions about how they would behave in any given set of
circumstances.6 A functional schema enables us to develop predictions by treating a
system on analogy with practical reasoning. For instance, by allowing us to treat its
parts as means in relation to the whole as an end. This lets us describe the causal role of
the systems’ components in terms of success and failure, and thereby to organise our
counterfactual reasoning about the causal relations between them in terms of the way
failure cascades throughout the system.7 The explanatory power of a functional schema
thus lies precisely in its introduction of the possibility of malfunction. It is the fact that
this is an essentially normative notion which enables functional explanation to connect
the epistemological and psychological dimensions of perception.
It remains to say something about the role of introspection in relation to these
explanatory demands. One crucial consequence of Sellars’ critique of the epistemic
given is that introspection must be understood as a genuine species of perception, rather
than sui generis.8 This means that whatever epistemic authority we possess in relation to
the objects of introspection is de facto rather than de jure, insofar as they are potentially
otherwise observable even if they are not in fact otherwise observed. It is because of this
that there is no need for a distinct phenomenological enterprise of describing what
perception ‘is like’, nor any good reason to think that our epistemological and
psychological theories of perception should be beholden to it. This is not to say that
introspection can play no role in the development of these theories, only that it plays no
privileged role in the process of assessing them. Instead, the capacity for introspection
and the associated language games involving ‘looks’, ‘seems’, and ‘what it is like’ are
themselves to be accounted for by our epistemological and psychological theories
insofar as they constitute a novel class of sensory inputs and behavioural outputs, which
play a derivative role in the practice of empirical justification insofar as they enable us
to modulate our observational claims (e.g., by introducing information about our
propensities to assert claims about observables into empirical discourse while
withdrawing commitment to those claims) and calibrate the perceptual capacities from
which they ensue (e.g., by comparing, identifying, and adjusting our responses to
features of my sensory system).
6 One way of cashing this out the idea of ‘organisation’ is to say that explanatory schemas provide us with
methods of grouping beliefs about a system’s circumstances that would, if true, act as defeasors for those
material inferences that encode particular aspects of the system’s behaviour. This is to say that they provide us
with cognitively tractable ways of carving out ranges of counterfactual robustness for these inferences. The
need for such tractable ways of sorting relevant from irrelevant information about causal systems (be they
implicit practical abilities or more explicitly formalised methods) is discussed by Brandom in chapter 4 of
Between Saying and Doing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), hereafter BSD.
7 These cascade patterns neatly group defeasors in the manner noted in the previous footnote, thereby
revealing the modal structure of the system’s possibility space. 
8 The consequences of this idea are initially presented by Sellars in his Myth of Jones (EPM, section XII),
in which he dramatises the origin and conceptual development of perceptual capacities to introspect internal
states.
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2. Content and explanation
Moving on to the explanatory resources, it strikes me that the purpose of the notion
of content is to talk about how two seemingly different states of distinct systems (the
vehicles) can nevertheless be the same in another sense (through sharing content).
There’s obviously a trivial sense in which this can be the case without warranting the
ascription of content at all, such as the sense in which two houses may be in a state of
disrepair, even while the precise nature and extent of their disrepair may differ. But to
say that they both share a content here would be to say nothing more than that they share
a property, and thus entirely redundant. This is not to say that states whose similarity
consists in common properties cannot share content on that very basis. Two VHS tapes
that share precisely the same magnetic properties will share precisely the same
informational content. The question is how we can say that an information storage
medium that works on different causal principles, such as a Betamax tape or a DVD
could share the same content as the VHS tapes. I’m going to use this comparison with
information storage media as the guiding analogy through which to think about the
explanatory role of perceptual content. I think we should aim to think about what it
would be for states of distinct perceiving subjects qua causal systems to have the same
content, in much the way that states of distinct information storage devices can have the
same content, before we address what it would be for this content to be perceptual, and
in what sense this makes it representational and/or conceptual.
In order to extend the individuation of the content belonging to states of causal
systems beyond mere similarity of properties, we must consider relations of
isomorphism between them. This means breaking down states into the features of which
they are composed and the relations between them, and then developing a way of
mapping these to the features and relations that compose the corresponding states. This
mapping schema (or morphism) allows us to count some feature of one state as
equivalent to a feature of another despite differences in their properties, insofar as it
occupies the same role within the system of relations that constitute it. We can then
determine if two states share the same content on the basis of some sufficient degree of
correspondence between their components. This would let us see a VHS and a Betamax
tape as possessing the same content insofar as there is some way of mapping the
magnetic properties of one to the other, despite the differences between these properties.
However, the problem with such pure isomorphism is that it can be arbitrarily extended
in ways that undermine any possible explanatory role it could have. We can potentially
construct arbitrary mappings that pair the magnetic traces on the VHS tape with price
patterns in the stock market, or pair the digital encoding of the DVD with a sequence
taken from the binary expansion of pi. Insofar as it completely severs the individuation
of content from any concern with the causal capacities of systems and their states, pure
isomorphism precludes identity of content from playing any role in causal explanation.
We can avoid these problems of pure isomorphism by using the functional roles of
the states and their components to constrain the mapping schema. In order for this to
work the relevant states must be variable features of the wiring diagram of the system,
and their variations must be functionally correlated with variable outputs of some sort.
For example, the VHS tape contains a length of material whose electromagnetic
properties vary in delimited ways, which will produce suitable variations in the patterns
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of light emitted by a TV set to which it is appropriately connected.9 On this basis, it is
possible to produce a functional mapping from the components of the one set of variable
states to another in terms of common outputs to which they are functionally correlated.
For example, we can produce a functional mapping from VHS to Betamax that maps
their distinct variations in electromagnetic properties onto one another in terms of
similarities in the patterns of light they engender when suitably connected to a TV set.
In essence, we treat the states possessing content as isomorphic with one another insofar
as their components can be mapped onto the same set of functional roles, which are
themselves isomorphic with the output they are supposed to produce. It is this
dependence upon a common output mechanism that allows functionally individuated
content to play a useful role in causal explanation.
However, there are still questions regarding the fineness of grain of such
isomorphisms. As an illustrative example, consider the way that the contents of a VHS
tape can be copied from one tape to another. This process never reproduces the
electromagnetic properties of the first tape exactly, with serial copying eventually
introducing so much distortion as to completely eradicate the original pattern. There is
thus a legitimate question as to where precisely in a series of copies the tapes cease to
bare the same content as the original, or precisely how much variance the mapping
relation will tolerate. Similar problems emerge if we consider intrinsic differences
between storage mediums and formats, such as the difference between analog and digital
encoding, or the difference between higher and lower resolution digital encoding. This
suggests that there are many possible mapping relations corresponding to different sorts
of fineness of grain, insofar as they permit different sorts of variance between the outputs
to which the relevant component states are correlated. The lesson to learn from this is
that individuating content can be more complicated than it initially seems, and that
discussions of content often make appeals to implicit criteria for selecting mapping
relations. There is nothing troubling about this per se, any more than there is about
implicit restrictions on quantification in natural language. However, it should make us
cautious about assuming that there is a natural way of individuating the contents of
perception that we can easily appeal to to secure a common object of debate.
There are two final points to make about functional mapping. The first point is that
we need not yet characterise content individuated this way as representational. It is all
too tempting to say that the content represents the output that it is functionally correlated
with. For instance, it can be tempting to suggest that two VHS tapes represent the same
movie, or that two records represent the same piece of music.10 Here it is important to
remember that ‘movies’ or ‘pieces of music’ are just as abstract as shared contents, and
that their correct showing or performance is subject to their own additional norms. One
might nevertheless think that content represents raw output, such as the patterns of light
or sound with which the information storage media are correlated. However, we should
resist the temptation to identify representation with mere functional correlation, as it
9 I am not the first to use an analogy with a TV set to try and elucidate elements of Sellars account of
perception. Edmond Wright deploys the same analogy in trying to explain Sellars’ account of sensory contents,
or what he calls ‘sensa’ or ‘raw feels’ (‘A Defence of Sellars’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Sept. 1985, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, pp. 73-90).
10 Sellars himself is guilty of claiming this at one point in BBK (§40).
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arises principally because the analogical character of functional explanation invites us to
treat the relevant states as if they were instructions for performing certain actions. The
second point is that it gives us a way of talking about form as well as content. The ways
in which the components of the relevant states can vary may be classified in terms of
more general functional roles they play, and these classifications provide more or less
abstract forms that correspond to the content of their specific variations. Put another
way, form consists in the functional invariants that delimit the variations in which
content consists. It is the structure of those elements of the wiring diagram in which the
range of variation of the content bearing states are encoded.
3. Perception, representation and Conception
We can now turn to considering which states of a causal system deserve to have
something called perceptual content ascribed to them, and to what extent they are
representational and/or conceptual. Here I am going to follow Sellars, who takes
perception to be the transition from a causally efficacious sensory input to a normatively
significant propositional output, or from sensation to conception. I’m also going to
endorse his account of the nature of this conceptually articulated output, which is
modelled upon the assertion of a declarative sentence.11 For Sellars, conceptual content
is primarily to be understood as the functional role that a sentence and its component
expressions play in the language game of giving and asking for reasons. This is a
linguistic practice composed by three distinct types of sentence-involving behaviour:
language-entry transitions (perception), intra-language transitions (inference), and
language-departure transitions (action).12 Language-entry transitions are the result of
behavioural dispositions to endorse sentences on the basis of non-linguistic sensory
input (e.g., to assert ‘it’s raining’ in response to the presence of rain) and language-
departure transitions are similarly the result of behavioural dispositions to produce non-
linguistic behavioural output on the basis of endorsed sentences (e.g., to use an umbrella
given endorsement of ‘it’s raining’, ‘the rain will ruin my shirt’, and ‘I have an umbrella
to hand’). Intra-language transitions (e.g., inferring ‘the ground will be wet’ from ‘it’s
raining’) may be counted as genuine moves in the game insofar as they can be performed
in accordance with rules of inference (ought-to-dos) rather than merely assessed in
accordance with functional norms governing the relevant dispositions (ought-to-bes).
However, that each type of transition is subject to normative assessment of whatever
11 The nature of the connection between language and thought presupposed by this methodological stance
remains  contentious. In his early work, Sellars restricts himself to discussing private thought episodes as
derivative upon linguistic ‘thinkings-out-loud’ insofar as the former can be understood in terms of their
functional role in producing the latter (cf. BBK, ‘Some Reflections on Language Games’ in Science,
Perception, and Reality (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 1963), pp. 321-358. Hereafter SRLG.), but in his
later work he attempts to account for the existence of private thought episodes (such as those belonging to non-
linguistic animals) that have no such functional connection to linguistic expression (‘Mental Events’,
Philosophical Studies, 1981, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 325-345.). However, others who have adopted the
methodological stance of the early work have rejected this later move (Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), ch.3, §5). I will not endeavour to resolve this issue here.
12 A more detailed presentation of these ideas can be found in SRLG.
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kind is sufficient to provide sentences with a unified functional role within the overall
economy of perception, inference, and action. Two sentences have the same content just
insofar as they are properly involved in the same transitions, and two component
expressions have the same content just insofar as their contribution to the roles of the
sentences they compose is the same. Insofar as system states can derivatively possess
conceptual content insofar as they are appropriately functionally connected to the
possibility of producing linguistic behaviour, the sense in which the transition from a
causal input to a conceptually contentful state counts as perceptual is to be understood
in terms of the sense in which a language-entry move is perceptual. Finally, I’m going
to take for granted that conceptual content is representational insofar as I agree with
Sellars that it signifies things in the world, but I’m not going to go any further into the
tortured question of how representation can be reconstructed out of inference here.13
On this basis, I think that anything worth the name perceptual content will be have to
be possessed by states of the mechanisms involved in the whole process of moving from
sensation to conception. Borrowing another term from Brandom, we could say that
perceptual content must be possessed by some state of the perceptual mechanism
underlying a rational agent’s reliable differential responsive dispositions (RDRDs).14
However, there are potentially many candidates for this, insofar as there can be numerous
subsystem states with variable functional outputs involved in the processing of sensory
information into conceptual content. Restricting ourselves to our own visual systems for
the moment, this can range from the pattern of activation on the back of the retina
(Quine’s infamous stimulus meaning),15 through neurological states of the various
information processing systems in the visual cortex, to neurological states of a global
system that integrates information from various sources and makes it available to other
cognitive processes (such as Thomas Metzinger’s phenomenal world model).16
Moreover, because content baring states can compose into further states, it is equally
possible to talk about combinations of any or all of these. There are multiple layers of
information processing between sensation and conception any and all of which can be the
subject of functional mappings insofar as they output to other layers or to the ultimate
conceptually articulated product. This panoply of options should give us further reason
for caution in assuming that there is a natural way of individuating perceptual content.
The question is now what it would be to say that any of these states possessed
representational yet non-conceptual content. This is what Sellars calls picturing as
opposed to signifying.17 The obvious thing to do here is to reach for the notion of
isomorphism once more, and to say that content which is already individuated by
functional mapping is representational just insofar as there is also an isomorphism
13 In BBK (section II), Sellars draws a distinction between two types of representation: signification and
picturing. The former is unique to conceptually articulated representations of language users, whereas the latter
is common to the sorts of environmental mapping and signalling that we share with non-linguistic animals. We
will say more about the latter notion below, but it is worthwhile noting that Brandom’s attempt to explain
representation in terms of inference in MIE can be seen as an attempt to articulate the former notion.
14 MIE, ch. 4.
15 W.V.O Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), ch. 2.
16 Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel (New York: Basic Books, 2009), ch2.
17 See fn. 13.
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between it and some state in the world, which it is thereby taken to represent. For example,
the content of the VHS and Betamax tapes may be the same insofar as they record the data
from the same security camera, and they may then be taken to represent the same events
insofar as there is an isomorphism between this content and the relevant events. However,
this suffers from the same problems with arbitrary mappings we discussed earlier, insofar
as we can conjure up isomorphisms with other potentially stranger events or states. We
might then suggest that this isomorphism is constrained by the causal origin of the
relevant states. However, this would leave us saying that if the tapes were warped in
precisely the same way by the same magnetic field, that they thereby represent that
magnetic field. Sellars’ solution to this problem is that the isomorphism must be more
deeply tied into the functional role of the content bearing state.
In ‘Being and Being Known’, he illustrates this using the example of a robot that
stores information on a similar magnetic tape, which he takes to picture its environment
in virtue of an isomorphism between the state of the tape and the state of the
environment. However, he also claims that:
This picturing cannot be abstracted from the mechanical and electronic processes in which
the tape is caught up. The patterns on the tape do not picture the robot’s environment
merely by virtue of being patterns on the tape. In Wittgenstein’s phrase, the ‘method of
projection’ of the map involves the manner in which the patterns on the tape are added to,
modified, and responded to by the other components of the robot. It is a map only by virtue
of the physical habitus of the robot, i.e., by virtue of mechanical and electronic
propensities which are rooted, ultimately, in its wiring diagram.18
To summarise, the constraints upon an isomorphism that allows us to produce a
representational mapping between the states of two systems does not merely concern
similarity of functional output, but a more complex relation of projection in which the
state mediates between functionally specified inputs and outputs. For example, we can
understand a variable state of the wiring diagram of a bee as representing the path to a
source of nectar insofar as it varies appropriately when the bee discovers the source of
nectar and produces the behaviour of returning to it with other bees. Moreover, the dance
that the bee performs in order to direct other bees to that source represents the path insofar
as its variations are appropriately correlated with the behaviour of travelling to it.19
So, for a state of our perceptual mechanisms to be non-conceptual and yet
representational in this sense would be for it to play a functional role in a process of
systematically guiding behaviour in relation to sensory input that is to some extent
independent of any role played by conceptual content in guiding action, insofar as the
latter is derivative upon the role of sentences in language-departure transitions in much
the way that perception is derivative upon the role of sentences in language-entry
transitions. The question is thus to what extent such states can play an active role in the
move from sensation to conception (perception) without their role in the move from
sensation to behaviour being mediated by conception. This is not a question I aim to
18 BBK, §40.
19 This example originates in Sellars (SRLG, §§14-15), but it, and the associated account of picturing, are
developed in more detail by Ruth Millikan (Language: A Biological Model (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005)
pp. 96-98).
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completely resolve here.20 However, I do take it to be plausible to assume that there are
some such states, insofar as our perceptual capacities are not created out of whole cloth,
but are built upon aspects of our psychology that we share with non-linguistic animals
and pre-linguistic infants.
4. Universal and Parochial Content
Having distinguished between the non-representational, non-conceptual, and
conceptual contents that states of our perceptual mechanisms can bare in terms of the
functional roles of their components within these mechanisms, I now want to make a
further distinction between types of content on this basis, and see how this distinction
can shed some light on the myth of the categorial given. The distinction I want to draw
is between what I’ll call parochial and universal forms of content. The former covers all
forms of content whose individuation is dependent upon functional mappings that are
specified in terms of particular causal mechanisms, whereas the latter covers all forms
of content whose individuation is entirely independent of any particular causal
mechanism. We’ve already made this sort of distinction in considering the difference
between contents individuated in terms of functional mappings and contents
individuated in terms of pure isomorphisms. The characterisation of the latter is entirely
mechanism independent, but ultimately cannot play a useful role in any causal
explanation, psychological or otherwise, whereas the characterisation of the former,
along with the representational mappings we have discussed depends upon the causal
structure of the mechanisms in terms of which the output is specified.
However, it is important to see that although the conceptual content that results from
perception is functionally individuated, it is nevertheless universal in the sense just
defined. This is because the language games from which these functional roles are
derived are intrinsically extensible. Though any given speaker’s ability to perform
language-entry transitions is tied to the structure of their own perceptual mechanisms,
the concepts that they apply are not thereby indexed to those mechanisms. Although the
process through which we challenge and justify observational reports concerns the
proper functioning of the mechanisms that produce them, the assessment of this
functioning is open to arguments about the causal relationship between the states
observed and the system observing them. For example, arguments about colour
observations are open to information about colour illusions that depend upon our
theoretical grasp of how cone receptors interact with different wavelengths of light and
the way the information they produce is integrated by the visual cortex. This same
theoretical understanding of the causal relationship between colour and light has enabled
us to incorporate new and more accurate measurement devices into our practices. The
same applies with regard to concepts such as temperature, pressure, weight, and the like,
20 This is one area in which Sellarsian work in philosophy of mind could be fruitfully crossbred with
Heideggerian ideas, insofar as the latter’s emphasis upon abilities to practically cope with one’s environment
that need not involve inference, but can nevertheless be interrupted and adjusted in accordance with it,
provides a way of thinking about how such states might be involved in the mechanisms underlying our
behavioural dispositions.
3 Wolfendale:Anthony Bonner  11/04/16  10:14  Página 35
36
for which empirical science has enabled us to create superior means of observation and
measurement, thereby bootstrapping our ability to apply empirical concepts on the back
of our parochial perceptual mechanisms. In short, a concept that could only be applied
in one way would not be an empirical concept, insofar as that concept is supposed to
inferentially encode the causal regularities upon which the relevant perceptual
mechanisms depend.21 It is thus entirely possible for speakers with entirely distinct
causal economies to non-inferentially apply the same concept as long as their behaviour
can be appropriately triangulated from within the game of giving and asking for reasons
itself, insofar as the causal structure of any given perceptual mechanism is something
amenable to analysis through inference.
Nevertheless, this extensibility and the universality it implies does not detract from
the fact that our concepts are achievements of a distinct sort. The theoretical
understanding of causal structure encoded in the inferential role of our empirical
concepts is hard won. This inferential role is thus something that changes and grows as
the scientific enterprise revises and refines our understanding.22 This point is crucial for
making sense of Sellars account of categorial form, and thereby the myth of the
categorial given. Insofar as they are individuated in terms of functional role, concepts
display relatively fixed forms of functional invariance in much the way that forms of
functionally individuated content do. Just as form in general consists in more general
functional roles that group other functional roles by means of these sorts of invariances,
so categorial form consists in those more general functional roles common to
specifically conceptual roles. For Sellars, categories are just concepts that classify other
concepts in this way. The importance of recognising concepts as achievements is that it
forces us to recognise a difference between categorial form that belong to our concepts
qua concepts, and categorial form that belong to our concepts qua particular attempts to
inferentially encode structure of the world. This produces a distinction between logical
categories that remain invariant across the various revisions of our conceptual models of
the world (e.g., singular term, predicate, quantifier, etc.) and empirical categories that
uncover invariant features of these models that may nevertheless be revised along with
them (e.g., physical object, occurrent property, process, etc.).
This puts us in a position to explain the myth of the categorial given and to account
for its seductive character. I’ll begin by quoting Sellars’ succinct description of this form
of the myth:
To reject the Myth of the Given is to reject the idea that the categorial structure of the
world –if it has a categorial structure– imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an
image on melted wax.23
21 This connection between empirical concepts and causal modality is worked out in detail in Sellars’
‘Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them’ (in Philosophy of Science, Oct. 1948, Vol. 15,
pp. 287-313) and explored further by Brandom in BSD, ch. 4-6.
22 This raises questions about the degree of similarity of functional role required for sameness of
conceptual content that must remain beyond the scope of the present paper, lest we be dragged into the debates
about sameness of meaning that have raged in the philosophy of language at least since Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas
of Empiricism’ (The Philosophical Review, 1951, Vol. 60, pp. 20-43.) and the related debates about sameness
of reference for theoretical terms between different theories that have followed them in the philosophy of
science. 
23 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars’,
The Monist, Jan. 1981, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 3-90, Lecture I, §45. Hereafter FMPP.
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The first thing to unpack here is the notion of the categorial structure of the world.
This is the subject matter of traditional metaphysics, but for all of the competing sets of
categories to be found in the tradition there is scant explanation of their function beyond
‘carving nature at its joints’.24 For our purposes it is easiest to hold that it is whatever
empirical categories signify by means of classifying empirical concepts. Importantly,
this raises the question of whether categorial structure can be pictured by the non-
conceptual forms of representation that we share with animals and pre-linguistic infants.
To admit this would be to draw a parallel between the categorial form of our conceptual
systems and what we might call the phenomenological form of the relevant
representational mechanisms.
Leaving this to one side for the moment, I think we can reformulate the myth as
follows: it consists in the idea that there is some form of universal perceptual content
that is distinct from empirical conceptual content as Sellars describes it. This is just the
claim that there is some specific sense in which absolutely any two sentient creatures
could be said to have the same experience without having the same conceptual grasp of
this experience. To put this in terms of our guiding metaphor, this amounts to treating
ourselves as if we have TVs in our heads that have no particular causal-functional
structure. It means supposing that there is a kind of content that is self-individuating
insofar as it cannot in principle be individuated by means of a functional mapping
between its vehicles. This is where the temptation to treat perceptual content as that
which is available to introspection leads, insofar as it slides all to easily into treating
introspection as in principle the only mode of access to content. It is treating
introspection as sui generis in this manner leads to treating perceptual content as sui
generis in its self-individuation. The illusion of self-individuation is maintained by
illicitly individuating perceptual content on the basis of what we take it to represent (e.g.,
the pink ice cube we’re both looking at), rather than how it represents it (e.g., the
functional role the relevant states play in a wider behavioural economy that incorporates
the pink ice cube). This makes the posited content universal in the manner described
above, but only insofar as it becomes parasitic upon the conceptual content of sentences
we use to describe what it represents. It is on this basis that our ability to discriminate
features of the phenomenological form of our perceptual mechanisms through
introspective apprehension appears to us as unveiling a categorial structure that the
world itself has impressed upon us.
What is distinctive about the categorial form of the myth of the given is that those
who endorse it can insist that even if introspective reflection on the manner in which the
world appears to us cannot provide us with epistemological foundations for specific
claims about the world (the epistemic given), it can nevertheless play a more general
epistemological role in organising the process of making claims about the world by
delineating the categories we should use to organise our empirical concepts.25 The
problem with this is not so much that this sort of epistemological project is misguided.
24 This is a metaphor with a long history, originating in Plato’s Phaedrus (trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), §§265d-266a).
25 Husserl’s phenomenological project and the role that the notion of categorial intuition plays within it is
paradigmatic of this approach (cf. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Pure Phenomenological
Philosophy: First Book. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982)).
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If nothing else, itt is clear from Sellars later work on process metaphysics that he took
such work to be both possible and necessary.26 The problem is the idea that studying the
phenomenological form of our parochial perceptual mechanisms through any means has
anything interesting to contribute to this task.
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